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Abstract 
Mental and emotional well-being is steadily overtaking physical difficulty as the biggest health 
challenge facing young people. As a result young people’s emotional well-being and needs is 
a significant concern within contemporary youth studies. However, the intricacies of 
‘managing emotion’ have been somewhat neglected in the context of youth studies. In 
particular the role of discourses of emotional well-being to produce “feeling rules” (Boler, 
1999), to discipline, and to restrict expressions of emotion has been unconsidered. This article 
explores this problematic further with the intention of provoking a larger concentration on 
relationship between the policing of emotion and youth well-being discourses. Specifically it 
focuses on anger as one of the emotions that young people are encouraged to move away from. 
It outlines how young people’s right to be angry is policed through the construction of angry 
subjectivities as characterised by incompleteness. It focuses on two – the unresolved subject 
and the unreasoned subject. Young people, who are already constructed as incomplete, are 
particularly vulnerable to this policing. Drawing on a range of theoretical interjections on the 
disciplining of ‘adult’ anger, the article explores the political importance of anger, how it is 
limited for young people, and the complexities of engaging with anger in the context of youth 
studies. Given the limited attention anger has attracted in youth studies literature the article is 
intentionally provocative. However, as the article notes, this is a complex debate with many 
challenges and a much more detailed investigation is necessary. 
Introduction 
Young people’s emotional well-being is subject to increasing concern. Such concerns are a 
response to the disconnect between improvements in young people’s physical health and rapid 
decline in young people’s mental health (Furlong, 2012). The economic, social and educational 
pressures facing young people have resulted in a situation where two of the most common 
health complaints among the young are depression and anxiety (Furlong, 2012; Eckersley, 
2011). In response to this, both policy-makers and youth studies have argued that strategies for 
improving young people’s well-being need to support their emotional needs and help them, in 
Wyn’s (2007) phrasing, “become somebody well”.  
However, laudable as the aim to facilitate young people’s coping mechanisms and emotional 
‘well-ness’ is, this discourse implicitly reinforces the disciplining of emotion and imposes 
“feeling rules” (Boler, 1999; Ruddick, 1990). To illustrate the relationship between emotional 
control and well-being this article uses the example of anger. Anger has received little attention 
in youth studies literature. Drawing on the work of theorists such as Ahmed (2004; 2006), 
Lorde (1984) and Lyman (2004), the article demonstrates how anger has been both demonised 
and domesticated through discourses of care. Although the work of these authors is derived 
from the experience of adults, their observations resonate strongly with the experiences of 
young people. The article identifies the subtle manifestations of this 
demonization/domestication through notions of personal and social progression embodied in 
the notion of “moving on” and “being well”. The result of these discourses, the article suggests, 
is twofold. First is the construction of the angry subject as disordered and socially undesirable. 
Those who express anger apart from (and inhibits) overall social contentment (Ahmed, 2004) 
and interrupts social order (Shilling, 1990; Lyman, 2004). In the context of youth this subject 
is articulated through the language of ‘childishness’ and immaturity (James and Prout, 1990). 
Second is the obfuscation of the divide between expressions of anger and social and political 
change (Lorde, 1984). The blurring restricts individuals or groups from expressing their anger 
by positioning these emotions as (for adults) part of an interruptive political performativity or 
(for young people) as characteristic of immaturity, underdevelopment and emotional 
unwellness.  
The article proposes that the disciplining of anger is not just a problem for individual young 
people, it is also politically problematic. This is due to the fact, as the theorists cited in the 
article have noted, anger is potentially the most politically generative emotion. The expression 
of anger can provide an impetus for radical political disruption and change. That said, as 
Holmes (2004) notes, not all anger is political and it is important not to construct a binary of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ anger. Furthermore, the constructiveness of anger is interlaced with raced, 
classed and gendered subjectivities; for some young people (particularly young men of colour) 
the benefit of recognising anger needs to be counterweighted against other discursive tropes 
(‘angry young, black man’) which have been utilised against them and can delegitimise their 
complaints. However, the purpose of the article is not to advocate for more anger per se but to 
highlight the need to be mindful of the disciplining of anger within the campaign for young 
people’s ‘emotional wellness’. 
Politics and policing anger 
Before interrogating the disciplining of anger directly I want to explain why anger is an 
important concern. Anger is neither the sole nor the predominant concern of either well-being 
studies or the work of Ahmed, a central theorist explored in this article. However the 
importance of anger for political action, particularly political resistance, has long been 
recognised (and discussed) within philosophy. Anger, according to Lyman (1981) is the 
“essential political emotion” (Lyman, 1981: 61). It is “an indispensible political emotion - for 
without angry speech the body politic would lack the voice of the powerless questioning the 
justice of the dominant order” (Lyman, 2004: 133). Moreover, according to political sociology, 
anger occupies a special position in the catalogue of responses to social injustice as it is focused 
on the origins (and originators) of the injustice - a response to evil (Aquinas, 1947; see 
Henderson, 2008: 30) - rather than on the victims of the injustice. This argument is made by 
Henderson (2008) who defends anger on the basis that: 
[Anger] can locate blame for injustice and tends, more than other 
emotions, to motivate punitive and/or preventative demands against the 
unjust treatment of others. In contrast to victim-focused emotions such 
as empathy, anger focuses on the perpetrator of injustice (Henderson, 
2008: 30, emphasis in original) 
For Henderson, Lyman and others, anger contains the greatest potential for disrupting the 
dominant order, facilitating political dialogue, and propelling radical democratic change. While 
other emotions (empathy, shame, hurt) may generate sympathy and understanding anger “puts 
fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (Gamson, 1992: 32). As De Rivera et al (1994) argue: 
although sympathy for the unfortunate may provide the motivation for 
personal helping when a person is in a direct relationship [...] behaviour 
to secure justice in indirect relationships - is motivated by anger at 
injustice, by moral outrage, rather than sympathy (De Rivera et al, 
1994: 103) 
From this perspective, while sympathy is important, without anger political change does not 
become an imperative.  
The need for anger is also reinforced by the status of young people. Arguably, given the 
limitations on their engagement with traditional democratic politics (specifically voting), anger 
is more important for young people than ever. Within the present geopolitical and global 
economic context young people are frequently the group most negatively impacted by policy. 
The restrictions on and in education, introduction of age limits on welfare payments, and 
changes in employee pay and benefits the most obvious examples of this. Without suffrage, 
young people have limited recourse to express their discontent or exert a claim for fairer 
treatment. This argument resonates with the writing of feminist and post-colonial theorists who 
argue that “public anger [...] constitutes a demand for action on issues that have proven 
stubbornly resistant to other kinds of claims” (Sparks, 2015: 32).  
Despite recognition of their political worth, expressions of anger are frequently subject to 
discursive disciplining and silencing, particularly when they come from particular groups. This 
speaks to the impact of socio-cultural discourses and power relations on the interpretation of 
anger. As Bauman suggests, anger is not universally available; social, political and economic 
elites can more readily express their anger:  
the angry rich [...] have the right to be angry; they are allowed to pump 
their anger through loudspeakers installed on public squares in front of 
the offices of supreme powers - without any fear of being charged with 
selfishness, breaking solidarity, anarchy, anti-Americanism, or the 
mentality of a Luo tribesman (Bauman, 2012: 35-6)    
Bauman’s critique highlights the connection between having the right to be angry and class-
based privilege. This echoes a Bourdieu-inspired understanding of the interaction between the 
interpretation of subject’s actions and class-based identities. The angry rich (or angry elite) are 
interpreted as passionate whereas the angry poor are interpreted as riotous. 
 
Similarly, Boler (1999) and Holmes (2004) both argue that the right to be angry is also 
restricted based on gender. According to Boler women who show anger are policed through 
labels such as ‘shrill’ or the accusation that they are ‘too manly’ (Boler, 1999). Such policing 
is very much connected to what earlier feminist theorists such as Charlotte Gilman Perkins and 
Simone de Beauvoir described as the socialisation of women to be docile, less emotionally 
open and, ultimately, subservient to men. In terms of anger, its association with masculine 
performativity has prohibited women from expressing their anger on the basis that it subverts 
norms of femininity. As Holmes writes, “shifting sets of conventions have had some continuity 
in discouraging women in Western nations [...] from showing anger” (Holmes, 2004: 209).  
 
The qualification of legitimate anger based on the subjectivities of the expressers is further 
explored by Sparks (2015). Like Bauman and Holmes she describes how certain communities 
have their anger more readily constructed as uncivil or hostile regardless of the nature of their 
expressions. To support this she draws on Cristina Beltrán’s (2010) analysis of pro-immigration 
rallies describing how despite the ‘festive’ and ‘celebratory’ aspects of the marches (they 
included families, colourful placards and music) they were presented in the conservative media 
as resolutely un- or anti-American and hostile due to the racial profile of the protestors.  
 
That said, as I will discuss later on, it is important not to reify anger as a political motivator. 
To do so, according to Holmes (2004) risks suggesting that anger can be evaluated by how 
effectively it propels political action and change. The result of this is a scale of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ anger which excludes anger which is not visibly ‘political’ and valorizes the anger of the 
oppressed and inherently more valid or valuable (Sparks, 2015). Moreover, in defending the 
need for angry expression, it is important not to understate the potential for anger to be directed 
against ‘innocent’ bystanders or to ignore the different forms angry expression can take (from 
rudeness to violence) and suggest all angry expression is the same.  
 
However these considerations are not the primary interest of this article. Nor, indeed are they 
the main contribution of the above interjections. Rather these perspectives indicate the 
performative character of anger. This is detailed by Sparks who argues that the characteristics 
of the angry subject - as riotous or politically engaged - are publicly constructed and shaped by 
discourse. As such, the poor, for example, are not disciplined through holding anger away from 
them but through the construction of the angry poor as problematic. What I want to argue here 
then is that young people also fall into the category of groups who have their right to be angry 
restricted in this way. Efforts to move young people away from anger remove it from the 
catalogue of emotions available to them. Moreover, what I want to contend is that, although 
the aim to help young people channel frustrations discussed by well-being advocates appears 
relatively positive, they also facilitate this kind of disciplinary process.  
 
Centrally this article proposes that, as with the subjects analysed by the theorists above, the 
disciplining of young people’s anger is achieved through the construction of young people’s 
anger as part of a problematic performativity. For young people being angry is a performance 
of a problematised subjectivity characterised by incompleteness. While the disciplining 
operation of such subjectivities has to date been explored solely in the context of adults, it also 
resonates with the experience and treatment of young people. This is not to say that there is an 
agelessness to anger (i.e. that all anger looks the same) but that in the case of the ‘adult-located’ 
theorisation and young people’s anger, the angry subject is constructed as incomplete and this 
is used to silence anger. These subjectivities sustain a discourse which promotes either 
encouraging young people to move on from their anger or providing them with opportunities 
to “channel” their frustrations. These discursive themes are both implicitly and explicitly 
conveyed in youth policy and youth studies through programmes to support young people’s 
emotional development, for example, or increase their emotional well-being. 
 
Having proposed this argument I now wish to outline two of the subjectivities which serve to 
construct anger as indicative of being incomplete and as a result enable the disciplining of 
anger. These subjectivities I will address as the unresolved subject and the unreasoned subject.  
  
Disciplining anger 
The unresolved subject 
One way anger is controlled is through the production of the unresolved subject who has yet, 
due to at best emotional illiteracy (Boler, 1999; Holmes, 2004) and at worst wilful resistance 
(Ahmed, 2004; Lorde, 1984), to find resolution to the challenges they face or have faced and, 
ultimately, achieve contentment. According to feminist analyses of emotion – particularly the 
work of Sara Ahmed and Audre Lorde – it is through the use of linguistic terms such as “don’t 
be bitter” and “move on” that the governance of emotion is both most visible and most subtle. 
While this corpus of work is derived analysis of adults, its key arguments are also identifiable 
in relation to young people, albeit articulated differently. In the context of young people, this 
governance is articulated through the association of expressions of anger with childishness and, 
by implication, a child-like inability to ‘cope’ with the difficulties they are presented with. 
Children, as James and Prout (1990) argue, have been socially constructed as lacking 
competence and passively accepting their situations rather than actively seeking to change or 
resolve them. This is reinforced by neuroscientific discourses - which dominate well-being 
agendas - which project ‘the teen brain’ as underformed.  
Theorists have outlined the policing of emotion in a variety of ways. Ahmed (2004, 2007/8) 
argues that the ‘happiness turn’ and promotion of a project for societal well-being concerned 
with ‘moving on’ has delegitimized unhappy emotions such as anger. Writing on happiness, 
Ahmed argues that embedded within programmes to help people ‘move on’ is a command to 
stop highlighting social problems or conflicts as these undermine public joyfulness and 
contentment. Those who refuse to adhere to such commands are constructed as ‘unhappy 
subjects’, ‘kill-joys’ or carriers of melancholia (Ahmed, 2004). Using the example of the 
‘feminist killjoy’ as an unhappy subject, Ahmed highlights and critiques how unhappiness and 
discontent are depicted as failed sentiments within a social discourse which positions happiness 
as an innate social good. According to Ahmed, the possibility for subjects to express their 
frustrations with their current social position or to highlight the systems of oppression they may 
be subject to is removed by the presentation of happiness – not justice or recognition – as the 
ultimate “object of human desire” (Ahmed, 2007/08: 7). Campbell tackles this dynamic more 
overtly. Writing on the regulatory power of phrases such as “you’re so bitter”, Campbell (1994) 
explains: 
[...][The] strategic force of ‘you’re so bitter’ is to block the strategy of 
anger by both shifting attention away from blameworthy behaviour to 
the mode of expressive blame, and by shifting something about the 
blameworthy behaviour to the expresser herself, who is now meant to 
account for her behaviour. The expresser cannot account for or defend 
her intended anger, however, because her interpreters are no longer 
listening. ‘You’re so bitter’ is meant to be not challenging but silencing 
(Campbell, 1994: 51) 
 
Here, like Ahmed, Campbell highlights how commands such as ‘move on’ and ‘don’t be bitter’ 
can silence subjects and negate their ability to express their anger, frustration or complaint. In 
the context of youth, accusations of emotional immaturity or childishness operate in a similar 
fashion. While young people are unlikely to be told not to be ‘bitter’, they are frequently both 
told and trained to not to express their emotions ‘childishly’ or to act like children. This is the 
substance of writing both on the ‘new sociology of childhood’ (James and Prout, 1990) and 
critical pedagogy (Amsler, 2011; Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009; hooks, 1994). Writers in these 
fields depict the systematic silencing of children and young people’s emotions through the 
deployment of accusations of childishness which suggest the expresser is disharmonious, 
“asocial”, “incompetent”, and even “deviant” (James and Prout, 1990: 13-4) and the embedding 
of emotional training in the process of education. Contentment is not just an object of human 
desire - as it is in Ahmed’s happiness turn - but a characteristic of having successfully moved 
beyond childhood and developed into an advanced human being. As James and Prout state, 
“failure to be harmoniously socialised into society’s function meant, in effect, a failure to be 
human” (James and Prout, 1990: 14). As with Ahmed’s ‘feminist killjoy’ and melancholy 
migrant, both the young people who express anger and the anger they express are constructed 
as deviant and asocial.  
Notably, as Lorde (1984) argues, the disciplining of anger and delegitimisation of certain 
groups’ “right” to be angry is not solely articulated through top-down commands. Speaking of 
her experience as an African American involved in predominantly white feminist 
organisations, Lorde recounts how her analysis of the oppression she and other women of 
colour had experienced as intersectional, and the anger she expressed at it, was silenced by 
feminists who had not experienced or had indeed been complicit in race-based discrimination. 
To illustrate this silencing Lorde uses the example on an instance at a conference when: 
I [used] direct and particular anger [and] a white woman says “Tell me 
how you feel but don’t say it too harshly or I cannot hear you” (Lorde, 
1984)  
Holmes (2004) and Lorde (1981, 1984) identify the position of anger within counter-patriarchal 
campaigns as a consistent dilemma within the feminist movement of the 1970s. As Holmes 
writes:  
Part of the problem for feminists was its close association with cultures 
of violence and antagonism that many felt were central to patriarchy. 
The political value of anger in challenging ‘ingrained attitudes’ was 
recognized by feminists but they also wanted to value caring rather than 
simply emulating the kinds of aggression stereotyped as masculine [...] 
This kind of angriness was [...] criticized for being inauthentic and 
‘twisted’. Certainly it threatened feminist fantasies of women as full of 
‘good’ emotions (Holmes, 2004: 218) 
Lorde and Holmes’ interjections highlight the role of counter-hegemonic movements in 
perpetuating the modes of disciplining anger Ahmed describes. Feminists expressing anger, or 
advocating the expression of anger as Lorde does, are positioned as having not moved on from 
the emotional vocabulary epitomised by patriarchal, masculine violence. By not embracing the 
more naturalistic, from a cultural or difference feminism perspective (King, 1989; Daly, 1990), 
caring emotional dictums they are prohibiting the emergence of a “gynocentric” feminist 
solidarity which resists the masculinist prioritisation of “violence and individualism” over 
experiential learning and collectivity (Young, 1985: 173). Angry feminists occupy an 
unresolved subjectivity fractured between past oppression and future happiness or socially 
progressive politics.  
Lorde’s critiques are also resonant with the experience of young people. Organisations which 
are committed to allowing space for young people’s expression frequently espouse logics 
which serve to construct anger as antithetical to young people’s progress. For example, the 
emphasis in youth well-being policy and youth work on supporting young people express their 
emotions productively or to support young people develop emotional coping mechanisms 
suggests that young people who express their anger too ‘harshly’ are not able to cope or lack 
competency. They occupy an unresolved subjectivity between current challenges and 
competent, emotionally stable future selves.  
The disciplining of anger through the figure of the ‘unresolved subject’ is particularly important 
for youth studies as it both shows how notions of ‘happiness’ and positive ways of being can 
be mobilised as silencing measures and how movements targeted at supporting those who are 
angry can be complicit in this silencing. Analysing the project of supporting young people’s 
well-being and helping them develop skills to manage their anger through this lens illustrates 
the commands embedded in these seemingly supportive efforts. If moving beyond anger is 
praiseworthy then remaining in contact with anger – even if it is not vocalised – is problematic 
almost by default, regardless of the roots of this anger. As with Ahmed’s ‘feminist killjoy’, the 
angry young person, as the ‘unresolved subject’ of youth studies, is disciplined by the discourse 
of becoming well. This discourse both delegitimizes their anger and deflects critical 
commentary away from the reason behind that anger to the expression of it.        
The unreasoned subject 
According to Lyman (2004) and Ahmed (2004, 2007/8) a central tactic in the discursive 
disciplining of anger is the imagining of anger as antithetical to a subject capable of reason. 
Lyman (2004) identifies caring narratives which encourage helping people ‘channel’ their 
visceral anger – such as those present in youth well-being studies - as supporting the separation 
of anger from reason. Care and well-being discourses, according to Lyman,  position 
‘channelling’ as a means to increase the efficacy of complaint through making it more 
‘reasonable’ and palatable in the current social order. Like the figure of the unresolved subject, 
the result of these narratives is the association of anger which does not adhere to certain norms 
of expression and debate with an unreasoned subject. This subjectivity enables the disciplining 
of anger. Like the unresolved subject, the unreasoned subject is constructed and articulated in 
the context of young people through the language of helping young people become more 
emotionally mature or supporting their emotional development. This language is central to the 
discourse of socialisation criticised by advocates of the new sociology of childhood (Prout and 
James, 1990; James, 2004) and therapeutic education opposed by critical educationalists 
(Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009; Amsler, 2011).  
This form of governmentality resonates with the broader treatment of emotion under discourses 
of reason. Within philosophical discussions on what constitutes advanced societies, reason 
occupies a special position. It is not necessarily appropriate here to provide an overview of all 
philosophical discussions on reason from Aristotle onwards. Rather my intent is to demonstrate 
how notions of reason are used to limit subjects’ anger through positioning emotions (including 
anger) as incompatible with advanced reasoned thinking.  
According to Sartre ([1962] 1994) emotional responses (particularly anger) are deployed when 
particular ways of acting are too difficult:  
We can well conceive that emotional behaviour […] is an organized 
pattern of means directed to an end. And these means are summoned 
up in order to mask, replace or reject a line of conduct that one cannot 
or will not pursue. At the same time, the explanation of the diversity of 
emotions becomes easy: they represent, each one of them, a different 
way of eluding a difficulty, a particular way of escape, a special trick 
(Sartre, [1962] 1994: 22) 
Sartre’s conception of anger is important in terms of understanding how anger is disciplined 
and silenced. Sartre’s characterisation (and critique) of anger moves away from an imagining 
of anger as solely unbribled, visceral emotion towards an imagining of anger as a rejection of 
advanced and more difficult thinking. The angry subject is not problematic because they are 
uncontrollable, it is because they are refusing to engage in reasoned thought, instead opting for 
an easy, ‘inferior’ (ibid: 25) reaction to difficulty: 
Being unable, in a state of high tension, to find the delicate and precise 
answer to a problem, we act upon ourselves, we abase and transform 
ourselves into a being for whom the grossest and least adapted 
solutions are good enough […]. Thus anger now appears as an escape 
[…]. And the ‘angry’ conduct, though less well adapted to the problem 
than the superior – and impossible – behaviour that would solve it, is 
still precisely and perfectly adapted to [the subject’s] need (ibid: 25-6) 
Boler (1999) points to similar grounds for opposing anger in her critical assessment of writing 
on ‘emotional intelligence’ particularly the work of Goleman (1995). This body of writing is 
predominantly concerned with educating children and young people on how to maximise their 
‘emotional quotient’ and develop further their emotional intelligence. However, as Boler notes, 
underpinning this project is a problematisation – and pathologisation – of certain forms of 
emotional expression on the grounds that they do not adhere to norms of ‘rationality’ and 
reasoned behaviour (Boler, 1997).These discourses, Boler argues, “overlap with or include 
scientific discourses which codify, categorize, and/or universalize emotions” (Boler, 1997: 
205). As with Sartre, emotional education/intelligence discourses do not oppose emotion per 
se, rather they oppose emotion which is not embedded in reasoned debate:  
Emotions are permitted or legitimate, for example, when channelled 
into rational debate: we speak of “passionate” or “heated” debate; the 
speaker “felt strongly” about his position, and so forth […]. Examples 
of the rational discourse in common language include: “He was barely 
able to contain his rage”; “She lost her head.” (Boler, 1997: 205) 
The polarisation of reason and anger is also a feature of Weber’s writing on the conduct and 
behaviour of scientists. Technical rationality, considered the epitome of advanced scientific 
reasoning by Weber, is not laden with emotion. The first step to achieving this is to remove 
individual values from processes of reasoning. Without remaining emotionally neutral, 
scientists become “demagogues” (1958: 146), using passionate rhetoric rather than reasoned, 
evidenced argument.  
The association of unreason with anger is also conveyed by educational discourses promoting 
contentment and self-control (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009). As Boler argues, opposition to 
anger is an explicit element of contemporary education discourses which construct “’good 
temper,’ self-control, and self-policing as the keys to harmony and efficiency within societies” 
(Boler, 1999: 35). In formal education settings opposition to anger and the need to control it in 
order to become educated are made explicit. This is shown by Kulz’s research into the 
discourses of social control and exclusion manifest in secondary schooling (Kulz, 2014). Based 
on interviews with staff and students at a London academy, Kulz shows how angry speech is 
policed through a combination of student charters and disciplinary measures (for example 
suspension and exclusion).  
According to Lyman (2004), the separation of angry speech from reasoned debate and 
implication that there is an acceptable form of reasoned anger and an unacceptable unreasoned 
anger, facilitates the disciplining and “domestication” of anger. Lyman argues that through the 
imposition of normative understandings of reason (largely derived from the Weberian model 
of technical rationality) angry speech which does not take particular forms is delegitimised as 
forms of unreason. Helping young people develop ways to effectively express and channel their 
frustrations can, from this perspective, result in anger expressed outside normative 
understandings of ‘reasoned speech’ being restricted.    
A troublesome project 
Thus far this article has highlighted some of the ways anger is disciplined, namely through the 
problematisation of anger as emblematic of unresolved or unreasoned subjects. At this juncture 
it would be easy to campaign for the acceptance of anger wholesale. Yet such a defence is 
overly simplistic and misrepresents the nuances of anger. Ultimately, this serves to create an 
equally troublesome dichotomy of ‘good youth well-being studies’ (which allows for anger) 
and ‘bad youth well-being studies’ (which doesn’t). Allowing anger space within the lives of 
young people is neither straightforward nor unproblematic as considerations of anger in social 
and political theory highlight the potential for anger to be ‘used and abused’ (Lyman, 2004). 
Writing on communities of conflict or post-conflict societies Hattam and Zembylas (2010) 
outline how anger can be naturalized, reified and reiterated almost ad infinitum through 
anticipation of anger as a necessary emotion for those who have suffered injustice:  
 
Communities of conflict are often stuck in anger […] [T]o perceive 
anger as naturalized is to assume that there is no way out of it. In that 
way, the cycle of indignation is perpetuated (Hattam and Zembylas, 
2010: 29) 
 
Here anger is not an emotion that is available to communities of conflict but one which is 
expected of them, suggesting a universality of experience and reaction across these 
communities. Anger is enforced rather than accepted. Lyman (2004) presents a similar critique 
of anger presenting the social expectation of anger in reaction to particular circumstances as 
indicative of moral education and indoctrination. Within Lyman’s analysis of the ‘use and 
abuse of anger’, political order in contemporary societies is sustained through the mobilisation 
of self-righteous moral indignation. Individuals are conditioned to be angry in response to 
actions or events which deviate from social norms, thereby ensuring hegemonic social 
structures are maintained.  
 
A further problematisation of anger is presented in Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment which 
includes anger at prior injustices, addressed in the Genealogy of Morals. While Nietzche notes 
than anger at past injustice can generate creative thought and innovative behaviour by the slave 
(Owen, 2007: 71), the failure “to discharge or shrug off ressentiment” (ibid: 86), the inability 
to move past anger at previous injustices, “is part of a victorious slave morality that enshrines, 
not challenges, domination” (Holmes, 2004: 211). As Nietzche outlines in the Genealogy a 
defining feature of the noble is the ability to: 
 
Regress to the innocence of the predator’s conscience, as rejoicing 
monsters, capable of high spirits as they walk away without qualm from 
a horrific succession of murder, arson, violence and torture, as if it were 
nothing more than a student prank, something new for the poets to sing 
and celebrate for some time to come (Nietzche, in Owen, 2007: 86)   
 
Anger, as Holmes notes, although frequently considered as uncontrollable (Hattam and 
Zembylas, op cit) can be as much a form of ‘feeling rules’ – rules on how to feel - as any other 
emotion. Holmes, however, argues that such a critique of anger is only valid when anger, as in 
Hattam and Zembylas’s account, is embedded in an individual’s or a community’s identity. 
Such an argument suggests that the naturalized anger which Hattam and Zembylas and others 
find so problematic is a symptom of the conflation of identity and emotional expression. The 
community of conflict or oppressed subject is inherently angry and they are restricted to anger.  
 
While the depiction of moving on from anger as a necessary step for the oppression whose 
anger has been ‘naturalised’ (Hattam and Zemblyas, op cit) seems reasonable, there is a risk 
here in simply re-exerting the disciplinary command structures embodied in the unresolved 
subject. Holmes’s work points to Wendy Brown as providing a way out of this restrictive anger 
without reinforcing this disciplinary subjectivity. Emphasising the recognition that anger can 
lead to creative thinking within Nietzche’s ressentiment, Brown proposes moving from identity 
to politics of desire. Anger at past injury within Brown’s model is not solely the means through 
which the subject “resubjugates itself through investment in its own pain” (Brown, 1995: 74) 
but a vehicle for moving the subject/subjects towards a consideration of their desires. That said, 
according to Holmes, anger is only emancipatory when it is ambivalent. Desiring, moving 
anger, directed at achieving specific goals or moving from particular subject positions (for 
example moving women ‘out of the kitchen’) can and has enabled the policing of anger based 
on whether and how it will achieve specific political goals. To circumvent this policing Holmes 
argues that anger needs to be conceptualised as mobile but irregular in its momentum and non-
specific and variable in its destination.  
 
While Holmes’ promotion of politically useful and beneficial ambivalent anger seems to 
circumvent the problematic of Hattam and Zembylas’s ‘anger identity’ and Nietzche’s 
ressentiment, it requires a commitment to constant movement and change that some youth 
studies scholars may find equally – if not doubly - problematic. Such thinking requires an 
acceptance of what Bell (2010) labels nomadic utopianism. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, 
Bell describes how nomadic flight, a process of constant change and movement, “opens up 
spaces for active life and [allows] the creation of the new” (Bell, 2010: 24). This nomadic flight 
is made utopian because it lacks an object or goal, it changes without either aiming to achieve 
a specific goal or moving from a particular subject position. The anger in ambivalent motion 
promoted by Holmes resonates with this nomadic utopianist model. However, youth studies 
scholars focused on well-being, with their commitment to improving young people’s lives, may 
well find the disavowal of achieving specific goals and commitment to constant disruption 
unpalatable. Although the radical rupture that anger in motion can bring may be political 
progressive for Holmes, for young people it can be entirely distressing and tumultuous. As 
Furlong (2012) argues in the context of precarity, while precarious life can be liberating for 
some young people (particularly those from more socio-economically privileged backgrounds) 
for others instability is painful. Radical ruptures, including emotional ones, are to be avoided 
not embraced.  
 
Furlong’s critique of precarity is a particularly important comparator here for two reasons. First 
it again highlights the classed, gendered and raced histories that need to be borne in mind when 
critiquing the ‘domestication’ of anger. Anger, like precarity, is not an equal opportunities 
experience. As I have already noted, its relationship with discourse is interlaced with classed, 
raced, gendered and age-based subjectivities. While the ambivalent, remembering anger 
defended by Lorde and Ahmed may generate and facilitate political resistance to racist and 
post-colonial oppression for some, for others (particularly men) it can reinforce discriminatory 
subjectivities and tropes, e.g. the ‘angry, young, black man’. These subjectivities can be used 
to silence expressions of discontent by interpreting them as part of the performativity of a 
particular subject rather than based on a specific problem. This point is raised by Sparks (2015) 
who suggests that “angriness is not just a feeling a political actor experiences [...] but also [...] 
a ‘doing’ that constitutes angry political subjects” (Sparks, 2015: 34). The implications of this 
for youth anger is highly significant as it indicates that a demand for young people to be - or to 
be allowed to be - angry potentially reinforces a youthful subjectivity characterised by a natural 
angriness. Such a performativity already significantly empowered by the neuroscientific 
arguments on the naturally angry teen brain. This, according to Sparks’ analysis, provides 
opportunities for the complaints of young people to be constructed as reflective of young 
people’s natural angriness and not a state of injustice. In light of this problem, attempts to 
reshape anger to meet dominant models of political action – which Lyman condemns as 
‘domestication’ and Holmes considers as debilitating to ambivalent anger’s emancipatory 
potential – can be read as part of a project of highlighting the legitimacy of young people’s 
angry speech. The disciplining of anger that takes place is, from this perspective, a necessary 
evil.  
 
Second, Furlong’s argument also reflects the tension between the defense of ambivalent anger 
and project of helping young people develop strategies for targeted social and political action 
contemporary youth work leans towards (Davies, 2005; Harrison and Wise, 2009). The 
rationale behind disciplining anger is to find a way to support young people develop coping 
mechanisms for the daily pressures facing them without becoming subsumed by their anger. 
This reading of disciplining anger is conveyed through youth well-being and youth work 
writing which speaks to supporting young people develop coping mechanisms for managing 
frustrations (Davies, 2005), maintaining their “emotional good health” (Eckersley, 2011) and 
embedding emotional wellness in more holistically-driven education. Couched in the language 
of care and moving forward to more positive states of being, opposing anger is framed as being 
for the young person’s benefit (Boler, 1999).  
On the other hand, as outlined by Ahmed and others, to accept this association of helping young 
people and channelling or managing frustration uncritically ignores the disciplining emotional 
expressions counter to ‘progress’ (personal or social) they enable. While the approach of youth 
well-being advocates is well-intentioned, the closing down of anger through the promotion of 
moving past anger also serves to limit the possibilities for young people to develop and exercise 
their political voice – a political voice necessary to resisting the political, social and economic 
precarity young people are subject to. 
The interpretation of the project of helping young people achieve stability in tumultuous and 
precarious times as limiting development of transformative, affective political sensibilities 
amongst them is a common theme of educationalist writing on the oppression of young people 
under neoliberalism. As Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) argue, the imposition and prioritisation 
of contentment and well-being limits young people’s opportunities for engaging in politically-
oriented, critical thinking about the reasons for their anger, deflecting their attention away from 
issues of inequality and structural violence towards how they can be happy. Amsler (2011) 
extends this argument, suggesting that disruptive emotions – such as anger but also love, 
despair and passion – are essential facilitators of both critical learning and challenging the 
social order which is so damaging for young people’s well-being.  
The interpretations of advocates of discomfort such as Ecclestone and Hayes and Amsler are 
heavily influenced by writing on critical pedagogy or education for social transformation. 
Thinkers such as Friere and Illich, while proposing very different visions of critical education, 
both emphasise the need for participants in education for social change to be disrupted rather 
than satisfied. In his seminal work Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Friere (1970) positions feelings 
of anger and discontent (and recognition of such feelings) as the starting point for radical 
political action through collaborative learning. In Deschooling Society, Illich (1971) begins 
with a tirade against the neoliberal conflation of ‘education’ with ‘learning’ which has robbed 
people of their ability to be angry. Similar themes emerge in the critical pedagogy writing of 
hooks (1994) who promotes the necessity of emotional disruption and interruptions – for 
example loudness, screaming, laughing or crying - to the unsettling of neoliberal hegemonic 
oppression within and outside the classroom. Counter to the view that in light of the social, 
political and economic pressures facing them young people should be helped achieve 
“emotional well-ness” (the position taken by Wyn, Davies and others), critical pedagogy argues 
that “emotional well-ness” limits young people’s capacity to challenge the social, political and 
economic pressures which lead to them becoming “unwell”. Far from advocating making 
pressured young people become content, critical pedagogues such as Illich argue that it is only 
through discontent that any real change for young people is achieved. Such a position brings us 
back through the work of Holmes to that of Lyman – anger which is visceral, interruptive and 
in production is the fundamental political emotion and needs to be defended.  
However, there is another, potentially more obvious problem with the positioning of anger as 
progressive or politically generative - not all anger or expression of anger is positive or used 
positively. Sparks (2015) argues that this is under-recognised by advocates of political anger. 
According to Sparks, feminist accounts of public anger as the primary tool of the disempowered 
or politically silenced, depicts the anger of the oppressed as inherently socially conscious and 
justifiable. Sparks argues that this is problematic as it suggests that the impact of angry 
expression (as politically generative or oppressive) can be predicted. As Sparks contends: 
 
Prohibiting conservative anger assumes we can determine in advance 
how that anger would function within any given democratic struggle 
(Sparks, 2015: 32) 
 
While, as Bauman describes, the angry poor are treated as far less acceptable than the angry 
rich, this does not mean that their anger is somehow more just or socially conscious. If Holmes 
is correct and anger is ambivalent then it is not clear that anger will always be directed in a 
socially just way. As recent writing on the growth of Far Right politics among socio-
economically disadvantaged communities (Ford and Goodwin, 2014) indicates, the angry poor 
can be just as discriminatory as the angry rich. In light of this efforts to train young people how 
to express discontent and direct their anger so that the agentic power of anger (as a political 
tool) is not misused are slightly more justifiable. That said assuming young people’s anger 
needs to be trained could, following Rose (1990), facilitate the pathologisation of particular 
articulations based on the judgements of experts.  
Connected with this consideration is the issue of the form through which anger is expressed. 
This is analysed in depth by Sparks (2015) in her critique of the lumpen approach to angry 
speech within writing on civility which fails to delineate between different levels of angriness. 
Sparks argues that this failure leads to anger expressed through rudeness or complaint as being 
treated the same as more violent behaviours. In trying to allow anger room it is important then 
not to treat all angry expresses as equal. Given that anger’s form or direction cannot, according 
to Sparks and Holmes, be predetermined, training or controlling anger is potentially necessary.  
Conclusion 
 
This article started from the perspective that more attention needs to be paid to the disciplining 
of emotion by youth studies. In particular the potential for the project of helping young people 
manage their frustrations or channel their anger to support the removal of young people’s right 
to be angry. The article provided a robust review of both the importance of anger and how it 
could be disciplined through the deployment of problematised subjectivities – focusing on the 
unresolved subject and the unreasoned subject. These subjectivities are articulated through the 
language of ‘childishness’ or emotional immaturity or supporting young people’s emotional 
development and well-ness. It then explored the tensions which arise when attempting to allow 
anger a space, considering the notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ anger and the fact that anger may 
not be a positive or productive experience for all young people. That said, following critical 
pedagogy writing, emotional disruption is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed interruptions such 
as anger are necessary for generating critical thinking and, potentially, enlivening resistance to 
the societal and political pressures which are a source of emotional strain for young people.  
 
Overall the article has aimed to be provocative. It has intentionally drawn on theoretical work 
at some distance from youth well-being studies in order to suggest the resonances between 
these writings and attitudes to youth anger. Yet in attempting to make such wide-ranging 
theoretical provocations there are important debates the article has not engaged with fully. This 
includes the differences - or not - between the political agency or intent of angry speech of 
adults and that of young people. A question mark still remains over whether the political 
generativity of the practice of being angry can ever been used to mobilise political change 
without neutralising levels of interferences. A further debate which the article has tried to 
engage with albeit very superficially is the unpredictability of anger and the need to recognise 
that anger can - and frequently is - misdirected and harmful. Finally, young people’s 
perspectives on anger are notably absent from the article and there is a clear need for more 
information on their attitudes to how acceptable their anger is or what their perceptions of 
societal responses to anger are.    
  
However, these absences are potentially less a series of flaws with this article and more a 
further indication of the need for more study on anger and young people specifically. Clearly, 
as the literature suggests, the dynamics and problematics of anger require much more sustained 
critical engagement and discussion. Without this discussion taking place young people’s right 
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